That extra 2%

Your suspect feelings regarding the ownership-GM relationship I think that could be a fair critique of the Mariners. Unfortunately, we are left with few bits of evidence on the nature of that relationship, so most postulating on the topic is at best idle speculation. Which is not to say we cannot infer a thing or two.

I read The Extra 2% a few months ago, and found it an enjoyable read. However, I would critique the book as underdelivering on the sort of arbitrage aspect that the subtitle promises. The bulk of the book is dedicated to a history of the Rays and their terrible former ownership, which affected directly the team’s management. While there are interesting tidbits the book gets into when discussing some of the sabermetric approaches the Rays use, I felt that they wound up being a small consideration in the overall narrative. Not because I don’t think they are important, mind you, but because the team—and I think the author says this—was understandably unwilling to discuss it. However, the bulk of the book, and the subsequent improvement of the Rays, comes from no longer having absolute asshats running the team. They stopped signing terrible free-agents and sacrificing draft picks and prospects in order to focus on drafting and developing their own talent, like any small money team should.

While the Ray’s new ownership has a lot to do with their success, it wasn’t like only Wall Street traders could get in there and make moves smart enough to take the team out of the gutter. I think it is safe to say that anyone who wasn’t a fucking idiot would look great compared to previous Ray’s ownership (Keri’s book was very eye opening in this regard). And though our ownership hasn’t changed in a similar manner, management has.

While one could argue that the change of ownership and management of the Rays organization is evidence of a greater commitment to a smart approach than the Mariner’s current owners might have, I think it is an argument we would do best to avoid. One could simply point to Jack Zduriencik’s recent contract extension as evidence that ownership is willing to commit to seeing prospects develop. Further, our previous years of $100+ million payrolls are evidence that ownership will open the checkbook when the time comes. It’s hard to see them upping payroll for a bullshit signing after having been burned the last few years. It is much easier to expect them to do that when their money is going to be spent more effectively and when the opportunity is right.

The difference is that while the Ray’s literally could not afford to spend money, we can. However, there is no reason to throw money away just so we can say we signed someone. We all agree on that. As your laborious efforts show, that time is most likely not yet here. Our prospects are just now beginning to make their presence felt. Free agents are best when they fill a specific hole, and the Mariners are not one plugged-hole short of seaworthy at the moment.

Zduriencik inherited some terrible contracts. While we have been waiting for those to come off of the books, the farm system has been improving. The bad free agent signings you can pin on Zduriencik are essentially Figgins and Guti. While they have been disappointing, neither are crippling, and neither were terrible ideas on their face. In fact, at the time, it isn’t a stretch to say they were great moves.

Thank you for compiling that spreadsheet by the way—looks like a lot of work. I hope you keep updating it as time goes by.

About how ownership wanted Bavasi to follow in Gillick’s foot paths, to spend money, trade prospects, and win now. So that’s what Bavasi did. While it was Bavasi making all the terrible decisions, it couldn’t have happened without ownership forcing Bavasi to follow a team-building philosophy that just doesn’t work.

I think our ownership loved how Gillick built the team like that and thought Bavasi could do the same. After 5 years of losing, they realized you can’t. No one can build a team that way, except Gillick.

The key point to note here is that ownership learned something. We like to assume ownership was bad 5-10 years ago so they’ll be bad now, but these guys are smart. They didn’t become CEOs through chance. They know they made a mistake, and you can see it from the type of GM they signed right after – a former scouting director, a guy who preaches building from the farm.

This is why I have a hard time seeing the hate for ownership. Yeah, they made mistakes. But they learned from it. They let Z be, and give him time and resources when he needs it. Seems like a good owner to me.

By no means am I suggesting the argument against the owners is true. However, in reading the book I can see that the argument does have some merit. I also agree that the fact Z has received an extension means that ownership has learned.

I still think though that my (friends) premise that Moneyball is about finding undervalued assets instead of just sabermetrics holds. It’s just that since all clubs have better analysis tools available, it narrows asymmetric information between teams.

The Extra 2% also still extends to the fact that the M’s may be trimming payroll so that it’s available for later. It won’t sit well with the fans, but it possibly is the prudent thing to do while the young’uns develop.

This is a fantastic way to look at the “pipeline”, so to speak. I can really visualize the organization depth at various positions, and get a sense for just how rare it is to have e.g. someone like Ackley immediately rise and take off like he has.

Wouldn’t it be grand if e.g. Fangraphs had a feature like this? I’ve heard before that the Rangers farm is pretty solid, for example, but it’d be even easier to see if it were in this format.