The Possible Hidden Value of Patience
Disclaimer: Fairly long, not too exciting.
I used to hate running. At one point it was definitely the worst thing I regularly put myself through, but as I got into better shape I found my pace and running gradually became a great escape for me. While on a long run now I don't concentrate on how hard it is or how much longer I must go but instead let my mind wander from thought to thought. It has become a great way to focus for me, if only for forty-five minutes or so at a time, and on one of these recent runs I thought of an idea that I couldn't quite shake for a while afterward.
Players who aren't named Carlos Peguero generally learn at a young age the value of taking a pitch or two in their at bats. At first it is simply because young pitchers can't throw strikes. Around high school, at least for me, players begin to learn that just because a pitch is a strike doesn't mean they have to swing and by letting a tough early pitch go they may get a better pitch later in the at bat. Once players get to the beginnings of pro ball or college their approach is thought to be "advanced" if they can take a few pitches, work walks and generally get deep into at bats. Players with this kind of approach in the minors are usually the ones who develop into good hitters at the Major League level. We've known for ages that patient hitters are generally more valuable than free-swingers because their approach will lead to higher on-base percentages and gives them better odds of getting easier pitches to hit in any given at bat. These are basically the commonly accepted values of being patient but on my run I began to think about something that I hadn't really taken into account for a while.
You always hear analysts say that the team needs to try to work deep counts whenever they face a good pitcher. In fact, if you listened to the pregame show a few days ago you undoubtedly heard Mike Blowers say that the Mariners needed to work deep counts against Justin Verlander because by making him work hard they would be able to get him out of the game faster. This kind of statement is probably said hundreds of times by different analysts every year. Qualitatively, it is easy to understand that by getting the Justin Verlanders or Tim Lincecums out of the game earlier your team has a better chance to win. However, when we evaluate baseball we don't simply allow qualitative analysis to be our basis for argument so I have attempted to find a quantitative value for showing patience at the plate that WAR may miss.
First off, I'd like to say that I will be using Fangraphs WAR to determine value and used their database to determine my statistical values except for where otherwise stated. I also would like to say that, going in, I knew the value of seeing a few extra pitches per plate appearance would most likely be miniscule at best so I may use a few extra decimals in order to make sure I don't lose any data.
Fangraphs batted ball data goes back to 2002 so I limited my stats to the last 10 years. Over this period of time the average WAR of a qualified starting pitcher was 3.1 wins per year. The average starter also made 29.3 starts, threw 2906.9 pitches and pitched 182.8 innings. This means that the average start for qualified pitchers was about 6 1/3 innings and 99 pitches and the average value of these starts was about .103 wins. If we divide this value of wins by the amount of pitches we get a value of .00104 wins per pitch thrown.
Now that we have a rough estimate of what the value of any given pitch from the average starter is we can attempt to analyse the value of a batter who works deeper into counts. At this point I used ESPN's database to find the average pitches per plate appearance for batters in 2011. I used ESPN's instead of Fangraphs' because on Fangraphs it is much harder to see the total pitches seen for each player in the league at the same time. In fact, its still mostly a chore on ESPN as well, which is why I limited the data for average P/PA to this year only. I got a value of 3.814 pitches seen per plate appearance for the average qualified batter.
Since I now had an average value I needed a player to compare it to. This was probably all spawned a few weeks back when Matthew wrote about the Battlin' Luis Rodriguez so I decided to look at him first. He has seen 342 pitches in 87 PA this season for an average of 3.93. This deviates from the average by .117. If we multiply this value by his PA then we get 10.182 extra pitches he's seen this year. This equates to an unsurprisingly miniscule .0106 wins above the average player. Its only 87 plate appearance by a replacement level player, however, so I decided to look at Justin Smoak as well. Smoak sees 4.02 P/PA which equates to .05 wins so far this season and gets to about .13 wins over 600 PA.
This is, again, a tiny value so I decided to look at the Mariners in general. I limited this to only their current starters and regular players, except for Mike Carp and Greg Halman because I figured there'd be SSS issues. I calculated the average P/PA for each team in the last ten years and then treated the 2011 Mariners as if they were a full season. Over a full season the twelve Mariners I looked at gave me an average of 3.89 P/PA and .55 wins above average for the season. The average is brought up by players like Jack Cust and Smoak but is brought down to Earth by just about every other player. The Mariners have an awful offence so I looked at the Yankees. They, too, are dragged down by struggling or impatient players like Derek Jeter and Robinson Cano so they gave about the same result as the much worse Mariners.
In conclusion, I can say that there is most likely some sort of value derived by making a pitcher throw more pitches but at the end of the day, unless you have an offence full of Justin Smoaks or Mark Teixeiras it doesn't make much of a difference over a full season and, let's face it, if you have an offence full of players like those two you probably aren't going to be worrying about another win or two down the stretch anyway.
(Disclaimer II: I have no idea how I would derive the WAR of taking pitches because I don't know how many pitches a replacement level player would take per PA and over the years of data there were only a handful of players with 0 RAR bats. This is why I referred to any calculations as "wins above average" instead of wins above replacement.)
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I don't think that's what he was saying.
He just said that Cano’s lack of patience hurts the Yankees in THIS category.
by BrettJMiller on Jun 12, 2011 10:50 AM PDT up reply actions
The logic behind this just doesn't work.
You are taking a counting stat for pitching performance, turning it into a rate stat with a denominator that likely doesn’t make sense*, and then assigning that value to hitters for doing something that may correlate inversely or not at all with pitcher performance. Robinson Cano isn’t patient but is still a very valuable offensive player, for instance.
In your set up, if a team took a lot of pitches they would be accumulating a lot of pitching wins for the other team?
*Pitchers gain value by getting outs, not by throwing a certain number of pitches. The pitches are a means to getting outs, yes, and throwing more pitches is generally bad because it means they will be able to get fewer outs overall, but that would be accounted for in their value accumulation based on getting fewer outs.
by abender20 on Jun 12, 2011 10:54 AM PDT reply actions 4 recs
Also, you have not taken into account the disparity in value between starters throwing pitches and relievers throwing pitches,
which is what you should actually be trying to measure.
by abender20 on Jun 12, 2011 10:56 AM PDT up reply actions 1 recs
This part seems to be the most obviously damning
In your set up, if a team took a lot of pitches they would be accumulating a lot of pitching wins for the other team?
I was trying to wrap my mind around the process for a while but I kept coming up with this conclusion.
You say:
we get a value of .00104 wins per pitch thrown.
which means that each pitch is worth .00104 wins to the pitcher. Thus if a player made a pitcher throw 6 pitches as opposed to 5 in an at bat, he would be giving the pitcher .00104 wins according to your process. This should have been a red flag that your process does not make sense.
by Dewey N on Jun 12, 2011 2:07 PM PDT up reply actions 1 recs
Yea you two are both very correct with this point.
It never occurred to me for some reason that this would be the case. I must have gotten cocky. My question is, now that my original process has been debunked, how would one go about evaluating the value of making the pitcher work more? Or is it even possible?
by Robby The Kid on Jun 12, 2011 2:52 PM PDT up reply actions
So there's two ways to make a pitcher work more
One is to take more pitches and the other is to not make an out. To quantify the effect a hitter has on making a pitcher work more, in my opinion you would somehow need to incorporate both OBP and P/PA. I’d look at wOBA against after certain pitch counts (i.e. what is the wOBA against for the opposing team for the rest of the game after the average starter throws 20 pitches, 30 pitches, etc…) to quantify the effect of having the starter get to certain pitch counts. Not really sure where I’d go from there though. Honestly, I think an individual player making the pitcher work more has a very small effect overall throughout a season. Just my two bits
The conclusion here is flawed.
First of all, taking qualified starters is bad news, as I explained in another thread regarding DH performance. You cannot just look at qualified players and conclude that’s representative of the average pitcher. It’s not. It’s the average of a typically above-average group. So using qualified for anything throws off your baseline and renders the rest the math moot.
Premise-wise, sure you could take cumulative pitching WAR and divide it by total number of pitches thrown to get some sort of average amount of WAR per pitch, but that’s really useful and certainly not in this context, but what matters is, as abender states, a much more complex measurement of the average value of getting to the bullpen.
by Matthew on Jun 12, 2011 11:10 AM PDT reply actions 3 recs
The analysis is also flawed for a couple other reasons
The underlying assumption that “making a pitcher throw more pitches” somehow translates to more wins. Analytically, this is clearly conventional wisdom. You hear it all the time – be patient, work the at bat, get the pitch count up against the other team’s ace, so that he is out of the game earlier.
However, I think this is a problem that has a number of other variables. For example, the assumption really only applies if the pitcher replacing the starter is perceived to be worse. Using your Yankee example, getting past Sabathia to get to a collection of their mess of middle relief is one thing, getting past Sabathia to get to Mariano is clearly something else.
As mentioned above, there is also clearly a factor as to the overall pitch count – ie the reason to push the count is to get the pitcher to tire / throw themselves out / etc. This also does not necessarily translate too well in the analysis – ie if you have a number of pitchers / decent middle relief, rested bullpen, etc – then you kind of have an infinite supply of “fresh pitchers”.
Therefore, conventional wisdom (since well paid managers and batting coaches teach it), would indicate that your theory is correct, but trying to measure it is where this falls down.
And, being old school, I read a lot of posts about modern analytics (WAR, BABIP, UZR, etc) and tend to believe that this is statistics gone wild. Baseball is pretty simple – don’t try to overthink it.

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