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Around SBN: Pacquiao vs Bradley: Potential Undercard Fighters

A Thought on Baseball Management and Behavioral Economics

This is a thought per two articles I've read recently.  The first was Dave Cameron on Fangraphs asking where Sabermetrics should go next.  The other was Larry Stone's interview of Don Wakamatsu in the Maple Street Annual.

Specifically Wakamatsu said that part of why he bunts is, "everyone on the bench has to get off their seat when a guy [bunts].  That's the dynamic that's not in the numbers."  My initial instinct was to dismiss this sort of thing as silliness.  Whether or not you jumped out of your seat in the previous inning should have no bearing on your performance going forward.  But then later, Wakamatsu said when referring to player platoons, that a sense of fairness comes into play.  And this made me think of managerial actions through the lens of behavioral economics.

Specifically I thought of the dictator game which essentially looks at how people respond to being given a portion of a fixed allocation of resources.  In the game there is a fixed amount of resources (say, 100 dollars) and 2 players (players A and B).  Player A allocates themselves a portion of the resources leaving the remainder for Player B.  Player B then gets to accept the allocation given to them, or reject it and both players wind up with nothing.  In a perfectly rational world Player B would accept any non-zero number; they would be getting more than the nothing they had initially.  However, in experimental settings, the threshold for rejection was far higher than zero (usually in the 25-30% range).  Basically what this shows is that we’re biased against decisions we perceive as unfair, and this bias will lead us to act in ways that are detrimental to our own performance.

Now this game doesn’t correlate perfectly to divvying up at bats in a platoon setting, specifically the idea of rejection and the consequences of rejection are quite different, but I think that one could model a game such as this to investigate the psychological aspects of baseball more deeply.  How would you measure managerial trust?  I’m not sure.  But I bet you could come closer to quantifying its value.

Part of the appeal of baseball to the statistically inclined part of my brain is that it is a deeply controlled game.  Each interaction is both able to be quantified and discrete (pitcher/hitter matchup, ball in play, baserunning decisions).  Also, the end goal is very simple: win.  How do you win?  Score more runs than your opponent.  Runs and run prevention are perfect measures of utility.  Every action on the field has a definitive measure of utility.

But with all of that said, baseball players, like all people are irrational.  Perhaps more so.  And this is where Dave’s article comes into play.  I think there are two related questions that haven’t really been sufficiently addressed in a scientific way: how do you motivate players to behave in a utility maximizing fashion (get them to want to bunt only when bunting makes sense statistically), and if some of those techniques involve in-game strategies that do not maximize expected run value, are there times when those seemingly irrational strategies are actually preferable?  Maybe the motivational force of a borderline bunting decision actually has sufficient value in player performance to serve as a rational decision in an irrational world.  I don't know, but I bet we could find these answers.

Star-divide

Note: It’s very possible that what this post is about has been addressed elsewhere.  I just haven’t seen it much in the SABR community, so I figured I might as well write this up.  Also, I haven't posted a FanPost before... hopefully this comes out okay.

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The dictator game doesn't actually show irrationality.

It shows how much value people place on fairness.

If I offer Player B $30 from $100 and he accepts, but he refuses $2 from $100, then the value he places on fairness is somewhere around $28 (we’d need more tesitng to find the actual threshhold).

The belief that the dictator game demonstrates irrational behaviour relies on the implicit assumption that we can’t monetise the good feelings associated with sticking to our principles.

I don’t have principles, so I’d totally take the $2.

I like using semi-colons; they make me feel smart.

by Llewdor on Mar 8, 2010 12:27 PM PST reply actions  

If you define rationality that way then aren't all actions inherently rational?

You could explain any behavior as acting toward some currently unaccounted for principle(s) like fairness or trust. Where’s the line?

by Matthew on Mar 8, 2010 3:11 PM PST up reply actions  

As moral philosopher

I hate that economists use the term “rational” to describe “self interested maximization of goods that can be calculated on a single scale”. This is far too narrow of an account of rationality. Further, any view that entailed that everything people did was rational would be an overly broad view of rationality. That said, I think that if economics is supposed to be an empirical science and “rational” is supposed to be as norm-neutral as possible, economists should stick with the idea that everything anyone does is rational, and hence accept the first poster’s analysis of the case.

by Uncle Ted on Mar 9, 2010 4:41 AM PST up reply actions  

I don't see a conflict here

Economic modeling frequently relies on the assumption that rational behavior is profit maximizing behavior, and I used the two phrases interchangeably, perhaps to the detriment of my overall point. I meant profit maximizing… well, the baseball equivalent of profit maximizing which is Win Expectancy Maximizing. And I agree whole heartedly that this assumption generally gets in the way of our ability to use economic tools to understand human behavior.

The overall point derived from the thought that players derive utility from places other than Win Expectancy Maximization. Jeff had a post a couple weeks back asking why teams had given away so many runs on the basepaths over the past 25 years. Perhaps players gain utility from the excitement of the stolen base? Maybe they believe that getting a lot of steals will increase their value in contract negotiations? Those certainly would not be philosophically irrational decisions, but they are less than ideal in baseball terms.

I see there being real value in a team (most likely via the manager) that can both get its players to exhibit Win Expectancy Maximizing behavior and weigh the costs of deviations from those strategies against the costs of enforcement. We’re looking for marginal competitive advantages here, and while I’m not sure what sort of value this stuff could, but if it’s even half a win it’s probably worth investigating.

by spikefriedman on Mar 9, 2010 9:46 AM PST up reply actions  

That last supposition is where I disagree.

I think part of the problem is the stigmas attached to the terms ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’. To me there’s a difference between actions that are profit/utility/value/whatever-maximizing (rational) and actions that the actor thinks is maximizing, but isn’t (irrational) for any numbers of reasons like a lack of key information, market breakdowns, etc.

by Matthew on Mar 9, 2010 10:35 AM PST up reply actions  

If you want economic analysis that accounts for bounded rationality

then you’re pretty limited in where you can look. Mainsteam economics is completely out.

I’m partial to Austrian, but to each his own.

I like using semi-colons; they make me feel smart.

by Llewdor on Mar 9, 2010 11:21 AM PST up reply actions  

Isn't that what behavioral finance does?

Ignores their schism to instead focus on a model that actually accounts for depressions and recessions?

If Brad Pitt is playing Beane who do you want playing you?
JD: Eddie Guardado.

by GhettoBear04 on Mar 10, 2010 8:41 AM PST up reply actions  

this was correct maybe thirty years ago

Mark DeRosa: the rare utility player who can provide some utility.

by oldjacket on Mar 11, 2010 1:12 PM PST up reply actions  

There isn't one.

That’s sort of the point. Ecnomics (outside of Austrian economics) relies on the assumption that people are behaving rationally, and thus requires that their economic choices (and this game includes one) are correctly valuing everything from the point of view of the economic actor.

If we approach rationality more philosophically (as I typically would) then we can’t actually make judgments about people’s rationality (outside of noting the irrationality of internal inconsistency) without knowing the thoughts of the people we’re evaluating, and those thoughts aren’t knowable.

I would be overjoyed to be able to call people who refuse $2 in the above game irrational, because pointing out to people that they’re behaving like idiots is fun, but I can’t do that without making assumptions about how they value fairness.

I like using semi-colons; they make me feel smart.

by Llewdor on Mar 9, 2010 11:18 AM PST up reply actions  

Slight nitpick...

You call it the dictator game, but then describe the Ultimatum Game. Either way, it’s an interesting idea to try to quantify the effect motivation or a sense of justice that a manager creates. It’s relevant to the Rangers in that the main reason why Ron Washington has his job despite saying some bizarre things from a game management perspective is because the players all like him and ‘play hard for him.’

It’s relevant to the Mariners in that “Please play (hard) today Milton Bradley!?!?!!?!”

If Brad Pitt is playing Beane who do you want playing you?
JD: Eddie Guardado.

by GhettoBear04 on Mar 8, 2010 2:21 PM PST reply actions  

Entirely rational

The choice to not accept $2 would only seem irrational if this is taken as a lone isolated event, rather than a philosophical approach. Assuming that a person had to face this decision in real life, and that the outcome would have ramifications for the future, accepting $2 could establish a precedent that is very detrimental for one’s self. Punishing the dictator for making an unfair allocation, while causing short term personal loss, would hopefully have the effect of causing future allocations to be more personally beneficial.

This is why unions go on strike. And although it’s usually an entirely emotional reaction – managers will at times knowingly get thrown out of a game with the express purpose of hoping to influence future decisions by an ump.

For all the beauty of sabermetrics – one of the biggest errors sabermetricians make is to look at isolated incidents and not take into consideration that there may be many other factors at play.

by Edrac on Mar 12, 2010 10:31 AM PST reply actions  

I think they are well aware other factors exist.

What they do not do is make the incorrect assumption that all factors are quantifiable.

by Sec 108 on Mar 12, 2010 11:52 AM PST up reply actions  

You are of course correct

I should have said CASUAL sabermetricians.

by Edrac on Mar 13, 2010 10:36 AM PST reply actions  

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