LL on Deadspin

It's ludicrous that Elias, home to more obscure stats than anyone else, doesn't even use now-common measures like OPS and WHIP in their valuations. (Though it's impossible to blame them; this was the formula agreed upon by baseball and the MLBPA.) This gives us major inconsistencies, like these chronicled at Lookout Landing:

Among the potential free agents, there are 26 Type A's, 52 Type B's, and 102 unranked. The average 08/09 WAR (Wins Above Replacement) of the Type A's is 4.6. The average 08/09 WAR of the top 26 Type B's is 4.9.

The average 08/09 WAR of the bottom 26 Type B's is 1.5. The average 08/09 WAR of the top 26 unranked is 2.9.

21 unranked potential free agents posted a combined 08/09 WAR of 2+. Nine Type A's and 16 Type B's were below 2.

Guillermo Mota and David Weathers are Type B's despite posting WARs below zero.

Garret Anderson is a Type B despite being one of the least valuable players in the Major Leagues last year.

over 2 years ago andrewgolfsalot 1 comment 0 recs |

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I disagree with this:

The players lose because the added cost of losing a pick scares some bidders off, keeping offers lower. Half the teams lose because in order to qualify for compensatory picks, they have to offer arbitration to players they’d otherwise let go without a fuss. The other half lose because they have to surrender draft picks to sign players. So who does win?

Just like with the luxury tax, it’s the teams that can’t or won’t spend money.

This system vastly benefits a team like the Yankees. They can sign or trade for a million different type A players, practically run the league as they do, and then when they are tired of them they get rid of them and steal a worse team’s draft picks to restock their farm system with impact talent.

...and now I'm here

by CapSea on Nov 10, 2009 8:12 PM PST reply actions